This paper studies the relationship between the size of the fiscal multiplier and the degree of capital mobility in some Latin American countries. Mundell's (1963) and Fleming's (1962) models show that this effect could be very large or small (close to zero) depending on the exchange rate and the degree of capital mobility, and the potency of a fiscal policy is inversely correlated with the degree of capital mobility. Based on Mora's (2013) model, we argue that the multiplier might not be negatively correlated with capital mobility in these countries. In other words, the potency of fiscal policy could be small because the degree of capital mobility in Latin American countries is quite low. The empirical findings support our hypothesis. We have found that the size of the fiscal multiplier tends to increase or (at least) to remain around 1.40 in these countries in the short run; however, in the long run, this effect tends to decrease significantly to 0.34. These results also suggest that the effectiveness of fiscal policies in Latin American countries are still large but could be larger if they become more financially integrated with the rest of the world.
Fiscal Policy Effects and Capital Mobility in Latin American
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For instance, � equals zero, implying that there is no capital mobility between foreign and domestic financial markets; conversely, a very large value of λ (� = �) implies that there are no barriers for financial transactions-foreign and domestic assets are perfect substitutes for one another. Again, as in previous cases, � �� ��0, � � �� � �.
Equations (4), (5), (7), and (8) conform to a system of equations that represent the aggregate supply and demand of this economy. Since the system is linear, we can totally differentiate the system and use matrix algebra to find the effects of any shock on the economy.
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Equations (9) and (12) show the expected results of a government spending increase, while Equations (10) and (11) imply that an increase in government spending will cause a fall in the domestic price level and the nominal exchange rate.
Even though these results are important, the main contribution of this paper comes from the magnitude of the result in Equation (9), which is the fiscal policy effect on real output. To see how capital mobility affects the size and sign of this effect, let´s take the derivative of
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This is a very important result with significant implications for Latin America. It states that the degree of capital mobility enhances the potency of fiscal policy. Therefore, it is expected that the potency of fiscal policy might be limited, since most countries' domestic financial markets are not well integrated into the world, i.e., a relatively low capital mobility. Besides, as Equations (14) and (15) below show, the lower the degree of capital mobility, the higher the costs of the domestic currency (due to inflation and depreciation) during a fiscal expansion. These results are consistent with some historical events in Latin American economies.
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Ⅳ. Estimation and Empirical Evidence
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B. Openness
Considering that the degree of openness to trade might influence the size of the multiplier, Equation (16) could be written as:
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Given the fact that there is no such variable for measuring capital mobility, we use nkel's (1992) approach to select a proxy for capital mobility 3 . Frankel (1992) proposed the use of the real interest-rate differential:
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The models presented in Equations (16) to (20) are very useful and an excellent starting point but lack a dynamic structure that can show not only the short run but also the long-run effects. As a result, the dynamic version of the closed-economy model presented in Equation (16) could be written as:
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Equation (24) seeks to capture the possible effects of overall economic activity on government expenditure, where � � ��� � could be interpreted as an exogenous fiscal shock.
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F. Robustness
The empirical results shown in the previous subsections suggest that given the high values of the multiplier, fiscal policies in Latin America might play an important role for economic stabilization in the short run; however, as predicted by macroeconomic theories, its impacts in the long run tend to be rather negligible. In this sense, it is important to check whether these results are sensitive when we control for other variables that might induce a greater use of fiscal policy, e.g., inflation and oil production. For inflation, we construct a variable equal to the number of digits of the inflation rate. If the rate is less than 1%, we use 0; if it is equal to 1 and less than 10%, we use 1; if it is equal to or greater than 10 and less than 100%, we use 2; if it is equal to or greater than 100 and less than 1000%, we use 3; and so on. Similarly, for oil production, we construct a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the country is a producer and 0 otherwise. We consider these control variables because several Latin American countries have suffered severe hyperinflation problems, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, while others are oil producers and oil price changes might have affected government spending. Results are shown in the appendix in Tables A.1 to A.3 for the static and A.4 to A.7 for the dynamic models. We could only use the number of digits for the inflation rate as a control variable because when using a dummy for oil production, in some cases, the model could not work due to a near-singular matrix problem 4 . When controlling for inflation, the estimated coefficients are not very different from the ones reported in Table  6 . In other words, the estimated fiscal multiplier is approximately 0.34. In fact, as the theory predicts, it decreases over time, suggesting that monetary policy might have only temporary effects on real output. These results are consistent with the ones reported in the literature, e.g., Lopez (2016) , Gechert (2015) , and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) . As shown in the appendix, even after controlling for inflation and oil production, the estimated results are not sensitive to the control variables.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
Since the surge of fiscal policy instruments as a means for recovering the economies affected by the 2008~2009 financial crisis, the debate on fiscal policies' effectiveness in the United States and other countries has attracted much attention. Some argue that fiscal policies' effects vary because they depend upon the size of the multiplier. Besides, the multiplier varies across countries and over time and is determined by the exchange rate, the degree of openness, and the capital mobility, among other factors. Some others argue that during peacetime, fiscal policies are completely ineffective.
In this paper, we argue that fiscal policies might be effective because Latin American economies are somewhat different from developed ones. Given those empirical results, we 4 These problems might arise because correlations between open and the estimated error from Equation (24) and between the later and real GDP, for instance, are very high.
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conclude that the size of the multiplier tends to increase or remain relatively constant and that the value of the fiscal multiplier is relatively high. This implies that fiscal policies might be very effective in changing output or stimulating the economy not only in the short run but also in the long run. In the short run, the size of the multiplier is around 1.40, while in the long run, it is around 0.34; the cumulative effect is much lower, as theories and some other empirical studies suggest (Lopez 2016 , Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh 2013 , Gonzalez, Lopez, Rodriguez and Tellez 2014 , and Costa and Vaz Sampaio 2016 .
Finally, fiscal policies in Latin American countries have a much greater impact on their economies than those in developed countries, because the former have more government interventions (e.g., governments tend to play a significant role in producing some of the goods and services). Even though our results point toward this direction, it is important to continue exploring other variables that measure the freedom or control of capital movements in international markets, testing the hypothesis we have stated for Latin America countries. -3.45e-6* (1.88e-6) -3.88e-6* (1.72e-6) -2.35e-6 (1.7e-6) Control for oil production -2.23e-6 (1.66e-6) n.a.
# -2.78e-6* (1.50e-6)
Control for inflation and oil production -3.14e-6* (1.78e-6) (1.79e-6) n.a.
-3.22e-6* (1.87e-6) -3.28e-6* (1.72e-6) 6 (1.79e-6) n.a.
-0.14 (0.21) n.a. (1.79e-6) n.a.
-3.22e-6* (1.87e-6) n.a. (1.79e-6) n.a.
3.93e-7 (1.84e-6) n.a. 
